One of the distinguishing features of logic programming seems to be the notion of goal-directed provability, i.e. that the structure of the goal is used to determine the next step in the proof search process. It is known that by restricting the class of formulae it is possible to guarantee that a certain class of proofs, known as uniform proofs, are complete with respect to provability in intuitionistic logic. In this paper we explore the relationship between uniform proofs and classes of formulae more deeply. Firstly we show that uniform proofs arise naturally as a normal form for proofs in rst-order intuitionistic sequent calculus. Next we show that the class of formulae known as hereditary Harrop formulae are intimately related to uniform proofs, and that we may extract such formulae from uniform proofs in two di erent ways. We also give results which may be interpreted as showing that hereditary Harrop formulae are the largest class of formulae for which uniform proofs are guaranteed to be complete, along the lines of an interpolation theorem.
Introduction
It has long been known that there are e cient implementation techniques which make Horn clauses, a particular fragment of rst-order logic, able to be used as a programming language 12) , and that this class of formulae forms the semantic basis for the programming language Prolog 2;19) . It has also been shown that this computational paradigm is as powerful as that of Turing machines 20) . Thus we may think of Horn clauses as incorporating some form of algorithmic knowledge. As Horn clauses are not a particularly large fragment of rst-order logic, it is perhaps not surprising that this class of formulae has such a relatively strong property. There have been various schemes proposed for logic programming languages which are extensions of Horn clauses 4;13;14;16;17;18) . Given these various extensions, it seems natural to ask whether there is a maximal class of formulae which may be used as a programming language. Moreover, there does not seem to be a universally agreed criterion which may be used to determine what constitutes a logic programming language, without which any such notion of maximality would seem premature. A criterion of this nature has been proposed by Miller et al. 16) , in that they identify various rst-order and higher-order fragments as logic programming languages by showing that these fragments satisfy a completeness property for a certain class of proofs. However it would seem that a general criterion should be strong enough not only to verify that certain fragments may be used as programming languages, but also to discover such fragments in the rst place. Thus it seems natural to use the criterion of 16) , namely the completeness of goal-directed provability, to investigate this question of maximality for ( rst-order) logic programming languages.
A useful notion this context is that of a uniform proof 16 . A uniform proof is one in which the principal connective of the formula is introduced in the last step of the proof; in other words, when searching for a proof of a given formula, we need only consider the immediate subformulae of the desired conclusion. Hence we may think of uniform proofs as goal-directed, in that when searching for a uniform proof of a given goal, we may use the structure of the goal to determine the structure of the proof. We will denote uniform provability by`u. Such proofs lead to an identi cation of formulae with operations in a search space, and hence have a natural interpretation as instructions, thus establishing a direct relationship between proof and computation. This restriction also allows a more feasible implementation of the proof search process than may be done in the case of arbitrary (intuitionistic) proofs.
Uniform proofs may be used as a basis for logic programming 16;15) , and there are several interesting investigations along these lines. However, it is not the case that all intuitionistic proofs are uniform. Hence, one of the features of this approach is that the formulae involved are restricted to a class for which uniform proofs are complete with respect to intuitionistic logic, i.e. F 1`I F 2 i F 1`u F 2 when F 1 and F 2 belong to a certain class of formulae. One such restriction is that the formulae which may be used as assertions (i.e. those which may appear on the left of`) are Horn clauses, and the goals (i.e. those formulae which may appear on the right of`) are conjunctions of atoms, so that when F 1 is a set of Horn clauses and F 2 is a conjunction of atoms, then F 1`I F 2 i F 1`u F 2 . Larger classes of formulae for which the existence of uniform proofs is guaranteed may also be given 16) , and the largest class of rst-order formulae for which this property has been established is known as hereditary Harrop formulae. Intuitively, these formulae may be thought of as those which contain no negative occurrences of 9 or _.
In this paper we examine the relationship between uniform proofs and hereditary Harrop formulae, and we give several results which may be interpreted as establishing the maximality of this class of formulae. As uniformity is a property of proofs rather than formulae, it is not strictly possible to establish that a given class of formulae is the largest one for which uniform proofs are complete. For example, given that F 1`u F 2 , where F 1 and F 2 satisfy some restriction, for any formula F whatsoever, F 1 ; F`u F 2 . However, as we shall see, there is a natural relationship between uniform proofs and hereditary Harrop formulae. Essentially this is that whilst F 1 ; F`u F 2 , there is a hereditary Harrop formula D such that D`u F 2 , and D is related to F and F 1 in such a way that D is the formula \doing the work" in the uniform proof. The relationship between the formulae is made precise in later sections.
An important insight which arises from this analysis is that the class of hereditary Harrop formulae arises naturally out of the permutation properties of the rules of intuitionistic logic 3;11) This occurs by determining when it is possible to permute certain combinations of inference rules so that an arbitrary proof may be converted into a uniform proof. Thus we may identify hereditary Harrop formulae as a logic programming language purely from the notion of a uniform proof and the proof theory of intuitionistic logic; no prior knowledge of logic programming languages per se is needed. This suggests that the strategy of studying permutation rules in order to investigate the completeness of goal-directed provability may be used to identify logic programming languages independently of the logic in use; such a strategy has been used to identify logic programming languages in linear logic 8;9) In this way we may think of the permutation properties of the proof theory of the logic in question (in conjunction with the notion of goal-directed search) as determining what fragments of the logic may be used as a logic programming language.
Preliminaries
First we de ne hereditary Harrop formulae 16) . We assume the existence of a nite set of constant and function symbols, and a countable set of variables. We refer to the set of all ground terms as the Herbrand universe, denoted by U. De nition 2.1 D and G formulae are given by the grammar
where A is an atom.
We refer to D formulae as de nite formulae, and to G formulae as goal formulae.
The set of all de nite formulae will be referred to as D, and the set of all goal formulae as G.
A program is a set of closed de nite formulae, and a goal is any closed goal formula.
We will often refer to the above classes of formulae as hereditary Harrop formulae. Note that we do not allow negations here. We will refer to the formulae which do not contain any negations as negation-free formulae.
It was shown in 16) that an operational notion of proof`o may be given for the above class of formulae in such a way that for a program P and a goal G, P`o G i P`I G where`I denotes intuitionistic provability, so that P`o G i there is a proof in intuitionistic logic of the sequent P ?! G. Below we give a slightly di erent de nition, which we will denote as`u. The rules for the standard sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic are given in the Appendix. We will often refer to the ruleŝ
-L and -L as left rules, and the rules^-R, _-R, 9-R, 8-R and -R as right rules. The ?-R rule will be of little interest, as we will not be dealing with formulae which may contain ?.
De nition 2.2 We de ne the uniform rule for a formula F as follows:
The uniform rule for an atom is -L It is not hard to show that P`o G i P`u G; for more details, the reader is referred to 16;6 ). Our interest in hereditary Harrop formulae is due to the fact that uniform proofs are complete with respect to intuitionistic logic for this class of formulae, rather than due to a desire to implement a particular style of theorem prover for intuitionistic logic. The notion of uniform proof is a stronger requirement than intuitionistic proof; for example, 9xp(x)`I 9xp(x), but there is no uniform proof of the sequent 9xp(x) ?! 9xp(x). In this way we are more interested in the strength of our conclusions than a particular proof system. 16) that if the antecedent is a set of de nite formulae and the consequent a goal formula, then the sequent has a proof i it has a uniform proof. The converse to this result is not (strictly) true. For example, p(a) _ p(b); (9xp(x) q)`u q, but the antecedent is not a set of de nite formulae. Similarly, 9xp(x); 8x(p(x) q)`u q, but the antecedent is not a set of de nite formulae.
Hence, it is not strictly true that for F 1`u F 2 to hold we must have that F 1 is a de nite formula. However it seems that the rst uniform proof above relies on the fact that p(a); (9xp(x)) q`u q and p(b); (9xp(x)) q`u q, in which both the antecedents are de nite formulae. Similarly the second uniform proof above is dependent on the fact that the universally quanti ed variable may be replaced by any term, and hence the proof may be thought of as a template for a number of proofs of sequents of the form p(t); 8x(p(x) q) ?! q for any term t. In this way there seems to be a more subtle relationship between uniform proofs and hereditary Harrop formulae. Indeed, as mentioned above, it is not possible to give a strict classi cation of the largest class of formulae for which uniform proofs are complete, but it does seem that there is a relationship between uniform proofs and hereditary Harrop formulae which may be elucidated.
A result reported in 15) is that for sequents of the form ? ?! G where ? is a set of de nite formulae, there are no occurrences of the 9-L or _-L rules. Hence, if there is an intuitionistic proof of a sequent in which the antecedent is a de nite formula and the consequent a goal formula, then there are no occurrences of the 9-L and _-L rules and the sequent has a uniform proof. Thus we may conject that if a uniform proof of F 1 ?! F 2 contains no occurrences of either of these rules, then F 1 is a de nite formula and F 2 is a goal formula. This again is not true, as there may be parts of the formula F 1 which ensure that F 1 is not a de nite formula, but are not used in the proof. For example, 9xq(x); p(a)`u p(a) _ p(b), due to the fact that p(a)`u p(a) _ p(b), and hence F; p(a)`u p(a) _ p(b) for any formula F. This means that the relationship between a sequent F 1 ?! F 2 and some \equivalent" sequent D ?! G will require more investigation. In particular, the role of the rules 9-L and _-L need examination.
Note that apart from -L, the left rules may be thought of as converting the antecedent into a desired form so that the appropriate right rules may be used. Hence, from the point of view of goal-directed provability, it will often be useful to perform these manipulations before starting the \main" proof, as it were. This will be the case if we can interchange the order of the rules when a right rule precedes a left one.
It turns out that the nature of the 9-L and _-L rules may make this di cult, and so it may not always be possible to re-arrange a given proof so that all the manipulation of the assertions can be done prior to the proof search process. However, there are some conditions under which this can be done.
For these reasons we introduce below the concept of a de nite proof.
De nition 3.1 A proof is de nite if contains no occurrences of either the 9-L rule or the _-L rule. We denote de nite provability by`d. For this reason we will sometimes refer to the 9-L and _-L rules as inde nite rules.
As mentioned above, it was shown in 15) that de nite proofs are complete with respect to intuitionistic provability for a large fragment of hereditary Harrop formulae. Below we state the generalisation of this result for hereditary Harrop formulae. Proposition 3.1 Let ? be a set of de nite formulae, and let G be a goal. Then any proof of ? ?! G is de nite.
Note that it is not true that ?`u F ) ?`d F, as when the succedent is just an atom we may use either _-L or 9-L without violating the uniformity property.
However, the converse is true, i.e. that if ?`d F, then ?`u F. In other words, a sequent with a de nite proof has a uniform proof, but a uniform proof need not be de nite. ; space prevents us from giving the proof here.
The above theorem may be thought of as showing that if we ignore the 9-L and _-L rules, then we need only consider uniform proofs. Note also the strength of the contrapositive of the theorem, i.e. that if ? ?! F has a proof but no uniform proof, then all proofs of ? ?! F contain an occurrence of an inde nite rule. Thus an obvious way to ensure the completeness of uniform proofs is to restrict the class of formulae so that the inde nite rules become redundant.
One such class of formulae are de nite formulae, and the redundance of the inde nite rules for de nite formulae is precisely why de nite formulae are interesting. De nite formulae seem very apt in this context, as they force the programmer to present his or her knowledge in a relatively strong way. We may think of an inde nite formula as conveying less information than a de nite one. For example, the formula 9xp(x) carries less information than the formula p(t), which may be used to derive the former one. Indeed, if we may imagine an intuitionistic programmer asserting that 9xp(x) is true, we may expect him to be able to construct a term t such that p(t) is true. In fact this is a requirement if we insist upon goal-directed provability, as 9xp(x)`I 9xp(x), but we cannot derive the truth of any instance of p(x)
In this way it seems that there is a strong connection between de nite proofs and de nite formulae, which is that given a de nite proof of ? ?! F, we may extract a set of de nite formulae and a goal formula from the sequent, in the manner brie y described above. A more precise description is given below. We denote by > the formula \true".
De nition 3.2 Let F be an negation-free formula. Then we de ne
We also de ne def(fF 1 ; : : :
Note that def(F) is either > or a de nite formula, and that goal(F) is a goal formula. Note also that goal(F) can never be >. We thus arrive at the following useful lemma. Lemma 3.3 Let F be an negation-free formula. Then
Hence we see that def(F) and goal(F) preserve certain information, in that anything deducible from def(F) is deducible from F, and that anything deducible from F is deducible from goal(F). In addition, as shown below, the converse relationships hold for uniform provability. 0`u F, and a goal formula G from F such that G`I F and ?`u G. In this way we may think of this result as a version of Craig's Interpolation theorem 1) , in that given a proof of ? ?! F, then provided that there are no occurrences of 9-L or _-L in the proof, then we can interpolate a de nite formula D such that ?`I D and D`I F. Thus given ?, we can derive a de nite formula which is provable from ? and has the same consequences, provided that we consider only de nite proofs. Hence, de nite formulae arise naturally out of consideration of de nite proofs, which in turn arise naturally out of consideration of the permutability of the left and right rules in intuitionistic logic.
Maximality of Information and De niteness
The result above may be interpreted as showing what e ciencies we can make in the process of searching for a proof provided that we restrict our attention to de nite proofs. As described above, we may think of this in a similar manner to the Interpolation theorem. A criticism which may be made of this approach is that whilst inde nite formulae may contain less information than de nite ones, that information is lost when the inde nite parts of the formulae are ignored. Also, the requirement that the proof be de nite is a stronger one than merely requiring the proof to be uniform. Hence it may be interesting to examine what may be done to preserve (or strengthen) the original information rather than weakening it, and to see if uniform proofs are still su cient in these circumstances.
An obvious alternative approach to extracting de nite information from a proof is to nd a de nite formula of which the premise is a consequence, rather than a de nite formula which is a consequence of the premise. We may think of this approach as attempting to supply su cient information in order to make the formula de nite, rather than ignoring the inde nite parts of the formula, and hence we will be suggesting hypotheses which will make the formula true. This leads us to the concept of a de nite condition and a de nite consequence.
De nition 4.1 A de nite condition of a formula F is a formula which is the same as F except that We denote by defconc(F ) the set of all de nite consequences of F. If ? is a set of formulae, then G is a de nite consequence of ? if G is a conjunction of de nite consequences of each element of ?.
Note that a de nite condition of 9xF cannot contain any occurrence of x, and hence must produce a \ground witness" for x. For example, the only de nite conditions of 9x p(x) are atoms of the form p(t) where t is a ground term.
For existentially quanti ed variables appearing within the scope of a universally quanti ed variable, we may use the universally quanti ed variable to construct the witness. For example, one of the de nite conditions of 8x9y p(x; y) is 8x p(x; f(x)).
It should be clear that for negation-free formulae, de nite conditions and de nite consequences are de nite and goal formulae respectively.
It is not hard to show that de nite conditions and de nite consequences behave in the expected manner. Proposition 4.1 Let F be an negation-free formula. Then for any de nite condition D of F and de nite consequence G of F 1. D`I F 2. F`I G We may think of this as stating that D has more explicit information than F, so that if we were to consider an ordering of formulae in which F 1 F 2 i F 2`I F 1 , then the above proposition ensures that for any F, there is always a de nite formula D such that F D. Similar remarks apply to G, in that there is always a G such that G F. In this way if we think of a lattice of formulae in which the partial order is (intuitionistic) provability, then any chain has a least upper bound which is a de nite formula, and a greatest lower bound which is a goal formula. Thus we extrapolate from the formula to a more de nite statement.
It is not hard to show that de nite conditions and de nite consequences preserve uniform provability.
